Theories of the statutes differ as to the object of the contract. In the traditional theories of the hobbes and Locke contract, the treatise dealt with the terms of political association. The problem was, in particular, the reasons and limitations of the citizen`s obligation to obey the state. In its first formulation, Rawls` parties discussed “common practices” (1958). In his later explanation of his point of view, Rawls regarded the purpose of the agreement as principles of justice to regulate “the basic structure”: although social contract theory does not tell people how to behave, it provides a basis for understanding why society introduced rules, regulations, and laws. Without the theory of the social contract, our understanding of the necessity of these rules would be limited. In view of the fact that the end of the “union of men into communities” (para. 124) is the preservation of their wealth and the preservation of their life, liberty and well-being in general, Locke can easily imagine the conditions under which the contract with the government is destroyed, and men have the right to oppose the authority of a civil government, such as a king. When the executive power of a government turns into tyranny, for example by the dissolution of the legislature and thus the denial of the people`s ability to legislate for its own preservation, then the resulting tyrant puts himself in a state of nature and, in particular, in a state of war with the people, and they then have the same right to self-defence, as they had done before a pact to found the company. In other words, the justification for the authority of the executive component of government is the protection of the property and well-being of the people, so that when this protection no longer exists, or when the king becomes a tyrant and acts against the interests of the people, they have the right, if not a complete obligation, to oppose their authority. The social pact can be dissolved and the process of creating a political society can be revived.
In most cases, feminism defies any simple or universal definition. In general, however, feminists take women`s experiences seriously, as well as the impact that theories and practices have on women`s lives. Given the pervasive influence of contract theory on social, political, and moral philosophy, it is therefore not surprising that feminists have much to say about whether contract theory is appropriate or appropriate from the perspective of taking women seriously. Examining all feminist responses to social contract theory would take us far beyond the limits of this article. I will therefore focus on only three of these arguments: Carole Pateman`s argument on the relationship between the contract and the subordination of women to men, feminist arguments on the nature of the liberal individual, and the argument of care. One of the striking features of state-to-state relations, as opposed to relations between allies within a state, is the extent to which they occur in a context that seems more similar to the metaphor of the state of nature. While the problems associated with social contract theory on issues of justice and legitimacy are exacerbated only by the extension of social contract theory to the international context, the international context actually has some advantages in terms of question of origin in general and Humean objection in particular. Before establishing international laws or treaties, states are aligned in two ways that reflect the state of nature of Lockean or Hobbes. First, there is no authority above the parties to an alleged contract or international agreement.
Second, the adoption of such an agreement is based on the express consent of the parties concerned, and not on the tacit consent that Locke had to resort to in response to the problem identified at the beginning of this section: “Any man who has possession or enjoyment of any part of the dominions of a government thus gives his tacit consent and is bound to obey the laws of that government.  Many of the recent developments in negotiation theory and social contracts have adopted dynamic (Muldoon 2017, Vanderschraaf to come) or even evolutionary approaches to model collective bargaining (Alexander and Skyrms 1999, Skyrms 2014). This shows a general gap in negotiation patterns between what we can call axiomatic models and process models. The traditional axiomatic approach to the problem of negotiation dates back to John Nash, codified by John Harsanyi and popularized by R. Duncan Luce and Howard Raiffa (1957). Several fundamental negotiating solutions have emerged from this tradition. Each uses a slightly different set of axioms to generate a unique and generally applicable method of dividing a surplus. These are mainly the Egalitarian (Raiffa 1953), the Nash (1950), the Stabilized Nash (Moehler 2010), the Kalai-Smorodinsky (1975) and Gauthier`s Minimax Relative Concession (1986). The main point of contention between these theories is whether Nash`s independence axiom should be used or whether an axiom of monotony should be used (as the egalitarian relative concessions of Kalai-Smorodinsky and Minimax do), although to some extent all axioms have been denied. The intuition of the need for social rules and a government to apply them is due to an implicit “contract” with logic (i.e. the intuition that a government and its rules are a logical necessity) – not to a contract between the government and the citizens.
That is, the overwhelming majority of citizens intuitively recognize that it makes sense that the things we desire are universally more valuable than the things we think we need; We believe that we need what we believe, only as a means and because of what we desire – it makes sense that we consider our desires more precious than what we need. As a result, it makes sense for us to use a mechanism to pool and coordinate our resources (which satisfy our needs) so that we can maximize our desires (what we want). Government and its rules are sought only as a logical necessity – a mechanism for the logical allocation of resources to citizens and the fulfillment of other duties of need, such as the protection .B. The statutes consist of two main elements. The first is an initial pre-political situation, called by modern philosophers the “state of nature” and the “original position” of Rawls, the most important contemporary representative of social contract theory. In this initial situation, all individuals are equal, they are all arranged symmetrically to each other, and they all have some incentive to leave the initial situation in favor of a relative advantage obtained by entering civil society. The second element is a normative characterization of the Contracting Parties. The parties are described as (1) motivated by their own interest, insofar as they only accept the contract if they believe that they will benefit from the social interaction; (2) are concerned about the well-being of others, if only because they recognize that the benefits they expect from the social contract are subordinate to their desire to guarantee the same benefits to their colleagues; and (3) rationally or reasonably with respect to their understanding of their own interests, the interests of others, and the just or moral principles that should govern their pursuit of those interests. The concept of the social contract was originally established by Glaucon, as described by Plato in The Republic, Book II. Feminist criticism of contractual approaches to our collective moral and political life continues to resonate through social and political philosophy. .